Negotiations focused on restrictions on Iran`s main nuclear facilities: the heavy water reactor and the Arak IR-40 production facility (which was under construction but was never commissioned, as Iran had agreed in November 2013 under the Joint Action Plan (interim agreement) not to commission or supply the reactor); Bushehr nuclear power plant; Gachin uranium mine; Fuel Fordow`s enrichment plan; Uranium to Isfahan conversion unit; Natanz uranium enrichment plant; and the Parchin Military Research and Development Complex.  After the agreement was announced in Washington, President Obama quickly turned to the perhaps more difficult task of selling the agreement to skeptical lawmakers and U.S. allies in the Middle East. In the end, on July 14, 2015, all parties agreed on a comprehensive nuclear agreement.  At the time of the announcement, shortly before 11:00 GMT, the agreement was made available to the public.  Israeli leaders immediately condemned the agreement, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called it a “mistake of historic proportions.” The open letter, signed by more than 100 former U.S. ambassadors and senior U.S. State Department officials who support the agreement, begins by saying, “The Joint Comprehensive Action Plan (JCPOA) with Iran is a pioneering agreement to deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons.   On the other hand, Michael Mandelbaum, Christian A. Herter Professor at Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, wrote that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East ultimately depended “not on the details of the Vienna agreement, but on the policy of deterrence known during the Cold War.” Mandelbaum added that if Obama leaves office without Iran making the bomb, “the responsibility for an effective deterrence policy will fall on his successor.”  Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz said, “Nothing on the table will deter Iran. Sanctions are paper protests against an oil-rich nation.
Diplomacy has already failed because Russia and China are playing both sides.  As a result of the above, the “epidemic period” – the period during which Iran could manufacture enough equipment for a single nuclear weapon – will increase from two to three months to one year, according to the United States.